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THE 1934 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS IN THE FIELD OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW
DANIEL BEECHER'

The constitutional amendments under consideration are as
follows:
"Pleading guilty before committing magistrate," Article I, Section 8; "Permitting comment on evidence and failure of defendant
to testify in criminal cases," Article I, Section 13; and "Duty of
Court in charging jury. Court may comment on evidence," Article
VI, Section 19.
These amendments were adopted by the voters of California on
November 6, 1934.
The constitutional provisions permitting a defendant to plead
guilty to a felony complaint before a committing magistrate reads
as follows:
"If the felony charged is not punishable with death, the magistrate
shall immediately upon the appearance of counsel for the defendant
read the complaint to the defendant and ask him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty to the offense charged therein; thereupon, or at any
time thereafter while the charge remains pending before the magistrate
and when his counsel is present, the defendant may, with the consent
of the magistrate and the district attorney or other counsel for the
people, plead guilty to the offense charged or to any other offense the
commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is
charged, or to an attempt to commit the offense charged; and upon such
peal of guilty, the magistrate shall immediately commit the defendant
to the sheriff and certify the case, including a copy of all proceedings
therein and such testimony as in his discretion he may require to be
taken, to the superior court, and thereupon such proceedings shall be

had as if such defendant had pleaded guilty in such court."
This amendment was designed, of course, to expedite the prosecution of felony cases. On its face it appears to do just that, as it
eliminates the preliminary hearing and, upon a plea of guilty, provides that the magistrate shall immediately commit the defendant
and certify the case to the Superior Court. In a felony case where
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such a plea is taken, the delay caused by a preliminary hearing
and the fifteen day period thereafter for filing the information are
thus apparently wiped out and the defendant moved rapidly on his
way to sentence.
It will be noted that this amendment requires the consent of the
magistrate and the district attorney, or other counsel of the people,
before the defendant can thus plead to the complaint. At first
blush, it would seem that the magistrate and the district attorney
would readily give their consent to such a procedure, but if we
bear in mind certain provisions of the Penal Code imposing special
penalties upon defendants who have suffered prior convictions and
the duties of district attorneys to investigate criminal records of
defendants, if any exist, and to charge prior convictions in informations and indictments and prove them at trials, it will readily be
seen that taking a plea of guilty on a felony complaint before a
magistrate might well result in speeding up the wheels of justice
so fast that it would be impossible for the prosecutor to obtain
the necessary data to charge and prove prior convictions before the
defendant would be on his way to state's prison. This amendment in
practice actually speeds a part of the machinery of justice without
sufficient regard to the efficiency of other parts just as important.
In Los Angeles it takes on an average ten days to obtain from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Washington a transcript of
a criminal record of a particular defendant. By a rush order the
time may be cut to four or five days. After the transcript is
received, it is then necessary under Section 969-B of the Penal
Code, to obtain certified copies of the records of the penitentiary
or reformatory where the defendant was formerly incarcerated, in
order to acquire the evidence necessary to charge the defendant
in the indictment or information with the prior conviction and
prove the same at the trial. In most cases it is impracticable, if
not impossible, to get these facts in time to allege them in felony
complaints. The fifteen day period between commitment by the
magistrate and filing information, affords ample time for investigation and proof of a criminal record.
If the district attorney is to perform his duty in respect to the
matter of charging and proving prior convictions where they exist,
it follows that he should not readily give his consent to a plea of
guilty in a felony case before a committing magistrate, as such a
procedure is altogether too expeditious to permit him to observe
these provisions of the Penal Code to which we have just referred.
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The office of the district attorney of Los Angeles County, realizing
this situation, will not consent to guilty cases before preliminary
magistrates except in those cases where it appears certain that
defendants have not previous criminal records. It being practically impossible to ascertain at the early stages of the prosecution
whether or not a particular defendant has had a criminal record, the
amendment to Article I, Section 8, is of little, if any, value when
considered in connection with the other duties of the district attorney just discussed. Practically all the advantages that seem to
exist under this amendment are available to defendants who want
to waive preliminary examinations.
The constitutional amendment permitting comment on evidence
and failure of defendant to testify in criminal cases, so far as it
concerns us here, reads as follows:
"But in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not,
his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts
in the case against him may be commented upon by the court or by
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
This amendment, in the opinion of the writer, is of considerable
value. In this jurisdiction, it is now the common practice of prosecutors to call to the attention of the jury the failure of the defendant
to take the witness stand where such a situation exists. Although
it is not possible for anyone to state accurately what the effect of
such comment is, it would seem, at least from the standpoint of the
prosecution and also in the interests of the search for the truth,
to be helpful to the jury in considering the whole case. Probably
this amendment forces many a defendant to take the witness stand
who otherwise would stand mute. It is a fact that convictions in
Los Angeles County in felony prosecutions have increased about
four per cent since 1934. To what extent any constitutional amendment has contributed to this increase is of course problematical.
We now come to the discussion of Article VI, Section 19, of the
California Constitution, which reads as follows:
"Duty of court in charging jury. Court may comment on evidence.
The court may instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the
facts of the case, and may make such comment on the evidence and the
testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary
for the proper determination of the case. The court shall inform the
jury in all cases that the jurors are exclusive judges of all questions
of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses."
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This amendment must be considered in the light of certain decisions by the Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal of
this state. In People v. Patubo, 94 Cal. Dec., page 296, wherein the
trial court was reversed because of certain comments on the evidence, the Supreme Court says:
"Under the recent amendment (1934) to Section 19 of Article
VI of the State Constitution, a greater latitude is permitted to trial
judges in instructing jurors than was allowed before its adoption."
In the first case in which the District Court of Appeals construed this amendment, namely, in People v. Talkington, 8 Cal. App.
(second), 75, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed
because of the following comment by the trial judge:
'Ihave tried a great many cases in this court, and now I have the
right to state to you what I believe with reference to the evidence in
this case, and comment upon it and you have heard the argument of
the district attorney. I believe I agree with him almost absolutely."
Such a statement was held to be erroneous because it appeared
therefrom that the judge had become an advocate and that his
comments lacked impartiality and were argumentative in form. As
pointed out by these and other decisions, the right of the trial judge
to comment upon the evidence is not absolute in this state, but
apparently limited about as trial judges are limited in this respect
in the Federal Courts.
In actual trials of felony cases in Los Angeles County, judges
do not as a rule comment upon the evidence, notwithstanding the
power given to them under the recent amendment. Inasmuch as
the power to comment is virtually dormant in felony trials here,
thlis amendment has produced to date little, if anything, of value.
Can it be that trial judges follow the lines of least mental resistance?
If so, that is human nature. It is of course easier for a judge to
read instructions prepared by prosecutors and let it go at that than
to analyze the evidence intelligently and advise the jury fairly
thereon. We have heard of trial judges who are obsessed with the
fear of being reversed by appellate courts, believing no doubt that
reversals spell incompetency. This belief, we submit, is just another judicial error.
We close with the observation that as the voters of this state
needed educating to approve this amendment, so perhaps the judges
need educating to use it.

